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Commentary

THE DAY THE DIALOGUE DIED: A
COMMENT ON SAUVE V CA NADA©
CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI
In Sauvd v. Canada (2002) a sharply divided Supreme
inmate
Court
of
Canada
nullified
the
disenfranchisement provision of the Canada Elections
Act. One of the more important aspects of the majority
decision by Chief Justice McLachlin is her refusal to
let the concept of dialogue take her down the path of
judicial deference. This commentary examines the
chief justice's reasons for not taking this path and
explores how these reasons reveal the limitations of
the dialogue metaphor as originally articulated by
Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell. The commentary
concludes that any meaningful concept of legislativejudicial dialogue must recognize a coordinate
legislative authority to interpret a constitution.

*

Dans l'affaire Sauvd c. Canada (2002), la Cour
supreme du Canada, .prement partag6e, rendait nulle
la disposition de la Loielectoraledu Canada, relative A
l'incapacit6 6lectorale d'un d6tenu. L'un des volets les
plus importants de la d6cision majoritaire de Mme
McL-achlin, juge en chef, est son refus de laisser le
concept de dialogue l'emmener sur la voie de la
retenue judiciaire. Ce commentaire examine les motifs
pour lesquels la juge en chef na pas voulu suivre cette
voie, et explore en quoi ces motifs r6vlent les
limitations de la m6taphore du dialogue, comme l'ont
6 l'origine formul6e Peter Hogg et Allison Bushell. Le
commentaire conclut que tout concept significatif de
dialogue legislatif-judiciaire doit reconnaitre une
autorit6 -16gislative coordonn~e pour interpr6ter une
constitution.
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On 31 October 2002 the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its
decision in Sauv6 v. Canada (ChiefElectoralOfficer).1 At issue was the
constitutionality of section 1(e) of the Canada Elections Act,2 which
disenfranchised individuals "imprisoned in a correctional institution
©2007, C.P. Manfredi.
Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Professor of Political Science, McGill University.
Sauv6 v. Canada(ChiefElectoralOfficer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 [Sauv6 No. 2 ].
CanadaElectionsAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e), as am. by S.C. 1993, c. 19, s. 23.
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serving a sentence of two years or more."3 In an unusually acrimonious
set of opinions, the Court nullified the provision by a single vote. Two
aspects of the judgment stand out in particular. The first aspect is Chief
Justice Beverley McLachlin's openly hostile attitude toward the state of
U.S. jurisprudence on the question. She did not cite-even to rejectthe controlling U.S. decision on the matter, and she dismissed the
practice of criminal disenfranchisement in other jurisdictions in terms
that questioned whether such jurisdictions could even be called
democracies.4 The second aspect is her refusal to allow the concept of
dialogue to take her down the path of judicial deference.
Both of these elements of the judgment merit closer analysis, but
in this commentary I focus on the second: the concept of dialogue. Since
1999, either alone or in collaboration with James Kelly, I have been a
participant in the debate generated by Peter W. Hogg and Allison A.
Bushell's original dialogue article "Charter Dialogue."5 The essence of
that participation has been to argue that the "Charter Dialogue"
argument about legislative-judicial dialogue is normatively flawed and
empirically problematic. I suggest in this commentary that these
weaknesses are strikingly apparent in Sauv6 No. 2, which effectively
brought an end to the short history of the dialogue metaphor as a useful
guide to judicial decision making. This commentary begins by describing
the path that brought criminal . disenfranchisement to the Supreme
Court in Sauv6 No. 2. It then turns its attention to a general discussion
of the dialogue question, revisiting many of the arguments I have
advanced in other contexts. Finally, it turns to the Sauv6No. 2judgment
itself, in order to explore what it reveals about the limitations of the
dialogue concept.

Ibid., s. 51(e). In effect, this meant that only inmates of federal penitentiaries would be
affected by the voting restriction, since sentences of less than two years are served in provincial
prisons and/or jails.
' Supra note 1 at 548, per McLachlin C.J.C. ("that not all self-proclaimed democracies
adhere to principles of inclusiveness, equality and citizen participation, ... says little about what the
Canadian vision of democracy embodied in the Charterpermits").

' Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75 [" CharterDialogue"].
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I.

THE ROAD TO THE SUPREME COURT

In contrast to the United States, where the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the plenary power of states to disenfranchise convicted persons,6
prisoners' rights advocates in Canada during the 1980s and 1990s were
successful in challenging provincial and federal voting restrictions.
Constitutional challenges to the Canada Elections Act began in earnest
in 1988 and produced mixed results until a Supreme Court decision in
1993.' Prisoners' rights advocates achieved trial court victories in 1988
and 1991, but also lost one case in 1988.' At the appellate level, they
lost one case in 1988,1" but won two cases in 1992.11 As a result, by the
end of 1992, prisoners' rights advocates had secured decisions from the
Ontario Court of Appeal and the Federal Court of Appeal declaring the
relevant provisions of the Canada Elections Act unconstitutional.
Indeed, the Ontario court refused even to acknowledge the legitimacy of
the federal government's reasons for criminal disenfranchisement, and
the federal appellate court found the restriction
to be "arbitrary, unfair,
12
considerations.,
irrational
and based on
On 27 May 1993 the Supreme Court delivered its unanimous
judgment in the companion cases Attorney General of Canada v. Sauvd
(Sauv No. 1) and The Queen v. Belczowski' 3 The Court found the
lower court judgments in these cases so compelling as to require only a
two-paragraph oral judgment affirming that the act disenfranchised
prison inmates and thus violated the right to vote guaranteed by section
3 of the Charter.Parliament responded to the Sauvd No. 1 decision by
redrafting the Canada Elections Act to narrow the affected class of
persons to inmates of federal penitentiaries who have been convicted of
indictable offences. Predictably, prisoners' rights advocates reacted to
6

Richardson v.Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).

7[1993] 2 S.C.R. 438.

' Badger v.Canada (1988), 55 Man. R. (2d) 198 (Q.B.); Belczowski v.Canada, [1991] 3
F.C. 151 (T.D.) [Belczowski1991].
9

Sauvd v.Canada (Attorney General) (1988), 66 O.R. (2d) 234.(H.C.J).

'°Badgerv.Canada (1988), 55 Man. R. (2d) 198 at 204-05 (C.A.).
" Belczowski v. Canada, [1992] 2 F.C. 440 (C.A.) [Belczowski 1992]; Sauv6 v. Canada
(AttorneyGeneral)(1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.).

2

' R. v.Oake, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138-39 [Oakes], cited in Belczowski1991, supranote 8

at 165.

'3 Sauv6 v.Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 [Sauvi No.1].
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the amended legislation by filing new constitutional challenges to the
Canada Elections Act. A challenge was once again filed on behalf of
Richard Sauv6, while another was filed on behalf of a group of
Aboriginal inmates in Manitoba led by Sheldon McCorrister 4 In
addition to the standard voting rights arguments, these challenges also
advanced two novel equality rights arguments. 5 First, they argued that
prisoners, as a group, constitute a discrete and insular minority that has
been historically subjected to social, legal, and political discrimination.
Second, they argued that the criminal justice system is riddled with
systemic discrimination, as reflected in the disproportionate
representation of Aboriginal Canadians in the federal inmate
population.
In contrast to the Sauv6 No. 1 judgment, the trial court
judgment in Sauvd No. 2 recognized that there were important
objectives underlying the inmate voting disqualification and that the
disqualification had a rational connection to those objectives. More
precisely, the trial judge concluded that inmate disenfranchisement
could enhance civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law, as well
as the retributive component of criminal sanctions. He found, however,
that the disqualification was overly broad because of its blanket
application to all inmates serving terms of two years or more. In his
view, this was simply too blunt an instrument for achieving the federal
government's objectives. Instead, he suggested that the decision to
disenfranchise should be left to the discretion of sentencing judges, who
could decide on a case-by-case basis whether the individual
circumstances of the convicted offender warranted the additional
sanction of disenfranchisement. In that way, he argued, the
disqualification would affect only those inmates who actually deserved
to have their right to vote suspended.
The federal government appealed this judgment to the Federal
Court of Appeal, which issued its decision on 21 October 1999. Justice
Allen Linden introduced his majority judgment by observing that
[t]his case is another episode in the continuing dialogue between courts and legislatures
on the issue of prisoner voting. In 1992 and 1993, two appeal courts and the Supreme

'4

Sauv6 v. Canada (Chief ElectoralOfficer) (1995), 132 D.L.R. (4th) 136 (F.C.T.D).

'Although an equality rights argument had been raised (and rejected) in Belczowskil991,
supra note 8 at 162, the arguments presented in this new litigation were far more systematic and
sophisticated.

20071
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Court of Canada held that a blanket disqualification
in earlier legislation which was challenged, violated
not be saved by section 1 of the Charter.Parliament
enacting legislation aimed at accomplishing part of
the Charter.6

of prisoners from voting, contained
section 3 of the Charterand could
responded to this judicial advice by
its objectives while complying with

After noting that the federal government had conceded a
violation of section 3, and providing a pre-Charterand post-Charter
history of prisoner disenfranchisement, Justice Linden emphasized the
need for "close attention" to the particular context of the case in
determining whether the limitation on voting rights was proportionate
to the government's objectives.17
Justice Linden identified two contextual factors of some
importance to the case: the statute's relationship to the regulation of the
electoral process and the exercise of the criminal law power. In both of
these areas, Justice Linden stated that Parliament is entitled to a
relatively high level of judicial deference." In practice, this meant that
"Parliament need not examine the finest details of each and every
option open to them," nor "choose the absolutely least intrusive means
of achieving a legislative goal." 19 Justice Linden, along with Chief Justice
Julius Isaac, thus rejected the trial judge's view that Parliament should
have enacted an even narrower form of inmate disenfranchisement in
which the decision would be left to the sentencing judge. In Justice
Linden's judgment, the objectives of the statute were simply too
complex for the statute to be treated merely as a sentencing provision:
This prohibition is a hybrid which possesses elements of the criminal sanction as well as
elements of civil disability based on electoral law. While it is linked to the exercise of the
criminal law power, the provision also pursues valid electoral goals. With respect, the
Trial Judge impoverished the provision when he reasoned that it was merely a
supplementary sentencing provision. Parliament, basing itself on electoral policy, is
entitled to add civil consequences to the criminal sanction in subtle, multi-dimensional
ways. 20

6

' Sauv6 v. Canada, [2000] 2 F.C. 117 at 148 (C.A.).
17Ibid

at 162.

18Ibid.at 173-74.

'9Ibid.at 178.
2

Ibid.at 182.
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In the final analysis, therefore, Justice Linden reversed the trial
court and found section 51(e) to be a reasonable limit on the right to
vote.
By invoking the concept of dialogue in the first paragraph of his
judgment, Justice Linden was effectively issuing a challenge to the
Supreme Court: either let the legislation stand or rule definitively that
Parliament may not, for any reason or by any means, disenfranchise
inmates. Before turning to the Court's response to this challenge, I offer
my own summary and perspective on the dialogue question.
II.

THE DIALOGUE QUESTION

In 1998, Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci chastised those
who suggested that Canadian courts are "wrongfully usurping the role of
the legislatures" for having misunderstood "what took place and what
was intended when our country adopted the Charter."'" Rather than
posing a danger to "democratic values,'' as these critics and
commentators alleged, Justice Iacobucci ruled that the Charter
promotes a "dialogue between and accountability of each of the
branches" that has "the effect of enhancing the democratic process, not
denying it."22 In making this assertion, Justice Iacobucci gave the Court's
seal of approval to the idea that the Charter's structure provides an
ingenious solution to the problem of judicial supremacy. According to
this "dialogue metaphor," or theory of "dialogic constitutionalism," the
presence of a reasonable limits clause (section 1) and legislative
override clause (section 33), in particular, ensure that courts cannot use
"rights talk" to have the last word on public policy.
The dialogue metaphor to which Justice lacobucci alluded had
its origins, of course, in the " CharterDialogue" article that is the subject
of this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal.23 Although the
"CharterDialogue" article is as well known as any in recent Canadian
legal scholarship, it is nevertheless useful to summarize my
understanding of its argument. The article's purpose is to confront
criticisms of the Charter that, the authors claimed, are "based on an

21 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at 563 [ Vriendl.
22

Ibid. at 566.

' Supra note 5.
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objection to the legitimacy of judicial 'review in a democratic society. 24
The Charter dialogue strategy was to pursue an "intriguing idea ...
raised in the literature ...[but] ...left largely unexplored. That is the
notion that judicial review is part of a 'dialogue' between the judges and
legislatures." ' Although there are some instances where dialogue is
precluded,26 Hogg and Bushell argued that structural features of the
Charterensure that the "normal situation" is one in which "the judicial
decision to strike down a law can be reversed, modified, or avoided by
the ordinary legislative process. ,27
The structural features to which Hogg and Bushell refer, and
which Justice lacobucci affirmed, are fourfold. 28 First, section 33 gives
legislatures the ultimate power to reverse judicial interpretations of the
Charter.Second, section 1. allows legislatures to implement and defend
alternative means of achieving important objectives following judicial
nullification. Third, some rights are internally qualified and therefore do
not constitute an absolute prohibition on certain actions. Finally, the
Charter contemplates a variety of remedial measures short of
nullification. Taken as a whole, these features of the Chartermean that
the Charter"can act as a catalyst for a two-way exchange between the
judiciary and the legislature on the topic of human rights and freedoms,
but ...
rarely raises an absolute barrier to the wishes of the democratic
institutions. "29 To Hogg and Bushell, the theory and practice of dialogue
meant "that the critique of the Charterbased on democratic legitimacy
30
cannot be sustained.,
As Hogg and Bushell recognized, the idea of dialogue in
constitutional interpretation was not particularly novel.3 1 So why did
their particular version of the argument attract Justice lacobucci's
attention? The answer to this question lies in their empirical analysis of
"legislative sequels," which they defined operationally as "some action

24 Ibid.at

77.

2JIbid.at 79.
26
Ibid.at 92-96.
27

Ibid.at 80.

1 Ibid at 82-92. See also Vriend,supra note 21 at 565.
29
3
31

Supra note 5 at 81.
Ibid.at 105.
Ibid.at 79, n.12.
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by the competent legislative body" following judicial nullification.32
Examining sixty-six cases in which a court struck down legislation on
Charter grounds, they found that 80 per cent of those decisions had
evoked a legislative response.3 3 In addition, the exercise of judicial
review encouraged legislatures to engage in "Charter-speak" by
incorporating the language of Charterreview ("pressing and substantial
objectives" and "reasonable limits") into statutory preambles.3 4 Finally,
they found dialogue in judicial deference, as legislatures identified flaws
in statutes that required correction in the process of defending them,
even where courts did not detect a constitutional violation.35 In some
ways, Hogg and Bushell suggested that Canadian courts had fulfilled the
Charter's promise of transforming "rights-talk" into "democratic
conversation."36 Where others had discussed dialogue as an abstract
possibility, they claimed it had become a concrete reality.
What does dialogue mean, then, in practice? As alluded to
above, Hogg and Bushell offered two very different definitions of
dialogue in their original article. First, they suggested that "[w]here a
judicial decision is open to legislative reversal, modification, or
avoidance, then it is meaningful to regard the relationship between the
Court and the competent legislative body as a dialogue."37 Where this
condition is met, they continued, "any concern about the legitimacy of
judicial review is.greatly diminished."3 A few pages later, in setting out
their empirical test of dialogue, they indicated that "the 'dialogue' to
which this article refers consists of those cases in which a judicial
decision striking down a law on Charter grounds is followed by some
actionby the competent legislative body."39
As the Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton and Wade
K. Wright contribution to this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law

32

Ibid.at 82, 98.

33

Ibid.at 97.

4
3

Ibid.at 101-04.

IIbid.at 104-05. See Thibaudeau v. Canada,[1995] 2 S.C.R. 627.

36 See Allan Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 184-220. Hutchinson, of course, was highly skeptical about
whether the Chartercouldachieve this transformation.
37
38

39

Supra note 5 at 79 [emphasis added].
Ibid.at 80.
Ibid. at 82 [emphasis added].
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Journal notes, Kelly and I have argued that this definitional shift is
problematic.4 ° The practical question, then, is about what it means for a
legislature to "reverse, modify, or avoid" a Charter nullification of
legislation. The authors contend that we misread their suggestion that
the possibility of reversal, modification, or avoidance of judicial
decisions is a sufficient condition for dialogue as that it is also a
necessary condition for it. They reiterate that their definition of.
dialogue is, and always has been, "some action" by the legislature
following judicial nullification of a law. I do not deny that this is their
definition, but f do question whether this definition is operationally
meaningful enough to test their decisions about dialogue empirically.
The range of phenomena encompassed by the term "some action" is so
broad as to be analytically problematic. Under this definition, the only
time dialogue does not occur is when legislatures do not act at all after
judicial nullification. Yet, if every response is dialogue, then the
argument becomes tautological: dialogue occurs when legislatures
respond, and when legislatures respond there is dialogue. For social
scientists, a narrower definition of dialogue in which one of reversal,
modification, or avoidance is both a necessary and a sufficient condition
is more useful analytically. The practical question, then, is what it means
for a legislature to "reverse, modify, or avoid" judicial nullification of
legislation on Chartergrounds.
Legislative reversal of a Charterdecision is the most aggressive
response to judicial nullification, and it entails an outright rejection of a
court's basic constitutional interpretation that there is a conflict between
the impugned action and the Charter. I agree with the authors that
legislative reversal involves a legislature's acting on an interpretation of
the Charterthat conflicts with that given by the judiciary.4' I also agree
that the principal device for reversal in this sense is section 33. However,
for reasons explored elsewhere, legislative reversal in this sense is nearly
non-existent. 4" A modification response to judicial nullification involves
legislative acceptance of a court's basic constitutional holding, but it

I

Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, "Charter Dialogue

Revisited-Or 'Much Ado About Metaphors"' (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 [" CharterDialogue
Revisited"].
41 Ibid.at 33.
42 Christopher P. Manfredi, "Judicial Power and the Charter.Reflections on the Activism
Debate" (2004) 53 U.N.B.L.J. 185.
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takes advantage of the opportunity provided by the usual practice in
Charter adjudication of combining judicial affirmation of legislative
objectives with constitutional concerns about the means selected to
pursue those objectives. This is, in fact, the sense in which Justice
Linden invoked the dialogue metaphor to describe the relationship
between section 51(e) and earlier judicial decisions on inmate
disenfranchisement.
Of the three possible dialogic responses available to legislatures,
avoidance is the most difficult to define. In one sense, it can refer to the
obvious point that legislatures can always avoid judicial nullification by
persuading courts that legislation does not violate the Charter.As it
turns out, legislatures are actually quite successful at "dialogue through
litigation" in about two out of every three Chartercases decided by the
Supreme Court.43 The decision to appeal a lower court loss, and the
process of defending legislation in appellate courts, should thus be
understood as an important aspect of judicial-legislative dialogue;
indeed, it is the most direct form of dialogue. But are there techniques
of avoidance available to legislatures when the Supreme Court finally
strikes down legislation? One obvious form of avoidance for the
legislature is simply to ignore the decision. Legislatures might also avoid
Charter decisions by withdrawing from the relevant policy area.
However legislatures approach avoidance, it can only be considered
dialogic if it leaves the pre-decision policy status quo unchanged or
produces a new status quo that differs significantly from the one
approved by the Court. Legislative inaction that results in the
implementation of the Court's preferred policy position by default does
not really satisfy the requirements of dialogue.
To many observers of the Charter,especially outside of Canada,
the dialogue metaphor describes a mechanism through which Canada
has successfully implemented a constitutionally entrenched, judicially
enforceable bill of rights that simultaneously avoids the democratic
threat posed by judicial supremacy. Yet, there may be reasons to be
skeptical about the success of this mechanism. In particular, the
Charter's structure-especially section 1'may not be as robust a
guarantee against judicial supremacy as the dialogue theorists suggest.

4 Matthew Hennigar, "Government Appeals as 'Dialogue': Expanding a Contemporary
Debate" (Paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, 30
May 2003) [unpublished].
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Section 1 of the Charter,which provides that the rights and
freedoms set out in the document are "subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society," recognizes that constitutionally guaranteed rights
cannot be absolute in any functioning society. In this respect, section 1
resembles the "giving reasons" requirement that animates judicial
review of administrative decision making in the United States and other
jurisdictions. Under this requirement, rule-making discretion is mildly
constrained by the obligation to "inform the citizens of what [decision
makers] are doing and why."'
However, as Martin Shapiro argues, it is very difficult to prevent
the "giving reasons" requirement from becoming a substantive standard
of review. The reason for this "inevitable and peculiarly easy"
conversion, according to Shapiro, is that the requirement to give reasons
forces decision makers "to give a fairly full account of the factual basis
for [their] decisions, making it far easier for judges to second-guess
those decisions."45 It is relatively easy, Shapiro argues, for courts to
move from "did not give reasons" to "did not give goodreasons" to "did
not give good enough reasons." Ultimately, the distinction between
"good enough reasons" and "good enough policy" breaks down.
"Indeed," Shapiro concludes, "in rejecting various offered reasons, a
court can usually signal what substantive policy it would accept."46 In
fact, one can see this conversion in the Supreme Court's interpretation
and application of the "reasonable limits" requirement of section 1.
The Court offered its first definitive interpretation of this term
in R. v. Oakes.47 The Oakes test contains two elements. First, the
government seeking to defend the limit in question must show that its
legislative objective relates to "concerns that are pressing and
substantial in a free and democratic society."4 Second, the limit itself
must be 'proportionate to the legislative objective, which courts
determine according to a three-pronged proportionality test. To pass the

4' Martin Shapiro, "The Giving Reasons Requirement" in Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone
Sweet, eds., On Law, Politics and Judicialization(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 228 at
230.
45

Ibid.at 235.
at 248.

4Ibid.

4 Oakes, supra note 12 at 138-40.
48 Ibid. at 138.
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first prong of this test, the limit must be rationally connected to the
legislative objective. Next, the government must show that, by impairing
the relevant right or freedom as little as possible, the limit in question
represents the least restrictive means of achieving this objective. Finally,
it must be clear that the collective benefits of the limitation outweigh its
individual costs. Although superficially procedural, proportionality and
minimal impairment analyses represent strong forms of substantive
review. This is because they imply that a court can envision a better law
than the one under review, in the sense that the court's alternative
would achieve legislative goals at less cost to competing rights claims.49
III.

SAUVENO. 2AND THE LIMITS OF DIALOGUE

Although the Federal Court of Appeal considered Sauvd No. 2
to be a prime example of dialogue at work, the case actually offers a
good illustration of the limitations of the dialogue metaphor as initially
articulated by Hogg and Bushell. For.example, two of the key structural
components of dialogue are missing. First, section 3 of the Charteris
written in absolute rather than qualified terms. Unlike the right to be
free from "unreasonable" search or seizure, for example, the right to
vote is an either/or proposition. Thus, there is no opportunity for
legislatures to avoid judicial nullification by entering into a dialogue
with courts in litigation about whether the right has, in fact, been
infringed. Indeed, in one of the earlier inmate voting rights cases, a
different panel of the Federal Court of Appeal described section 3 as
"straightforward," "unambiguous," and in need of "no interpretation at
all."50 It is little wonder, then, that the government quickly conceded the
rights violation in SauvdNo. 2.
The second missing structural component is that section 3 is
exempt from the notwithstanding clause of section 33, thereby
precluding direct legislative reversal of judicial nullification. Chief
Justice McLachlin interpreted this as evidence of the "special
importance" accorded to the right to vote by the Charter'sframers.51
Moreover, this exemption from section 33 argued for applying a
stringent standard of justification for inmate disenfranchisement rather
49

Supra note 44 at 253.
soBelczowski 1992, supra note 11 at 452.
s'Supra note 1 at 536.
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than for adopting an attitude of judicial deference. Ironically, since this
exemption leaves the last word on voting rights to courts and precludes
legislative review of judicial review--contrary to Justice Iacobucci's
understanding of dialogue in Vriend 5 - Chief Justice McLachlin could
just as easily have interpreted the non-applicability of section 33 as a
reason for judicial caution. Indeed, the dialogue metaphor would seem
to support the view that judicial deference should increase as the
potential for dialogue decreases.
To be sure, perhaps the most central structural component of
dialogue-section 1 and the reasonable limits justification-was still
present in Sauvd No. 2. Yet, the Court's ultimate resolution of the
inmate disenfranchisement question illustrates the problematic-even
arbitrary-nature of dialogue, even under section 1. Writing for a
narrow five-justice majority, Chief Justice McLachlin was dismissive of
the Federal Court of Appeal's call to dialogue as a justification for
deference. According to her, the healthy and important promotion of
dialogue between the legislature and the courts should not be debased
to a rule of "if at first you don't succeed, try, try again. 53 The "you" to
which the Chief Justice referred was obviously the legislature, and in so
referring she was confirming the privileged position of the judiciary in
the dialogic exchange by virtue of its power to terminate the dialogue at
a moment of its choosing. This was precisely what she decided to do
with respect to inmate disenfranchisement, by structuring her judgment
in such a way as to preclude any further legislative response to judicial
nullification short of formal constitutional amendment.
The capacity of section 1 to serve as an instrument of dialogue is
limited to cases where judicial nullification is based on the "least
restrictive means" prong of the Oakes proportionality test. In these
cases, governments can re-enact their legislative objectives through
ordinary legislation, albeit within new parameters set by the court.
However, if legislation is nullified because its objectives are determined
not to be "pressing or substantial," or because the court fails to find a
rational connection between the means and ends, then legislatures are
left with severely limited or non-existent response options. In Sauvd No.
1, the Supreme Court avoided this outcome by ignoring these

52

Supra note 21 at 565-66.

53
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components of the Oakes test and simply focusing on the fact that
section 51(e) was overly broad to meet the minimal impairment
component of the proportionality test.54 Similarly, the trial court in
Sauv6 No. 2 accepted both the government's objectives and the rational
connection between inmate disenfranchisement and the achievement of
those objectives. Chief Justice McLachlin, however, took a very different
view of these questions in the majority judgment.
The Chief Justice began the judgment by characterizing the
dispute as one concerning "core democratic rights" rather than
"competing social philosophies."55 The judicial role under the Charter,
she continued, is to uphold and maintain "an inclusive, participatory
democratic framework within which citizens can explore and pursue
different conceptions of the good."56 Courts must therefore be "vigilant
in fulfilling their constitutional duty to protect the integrity of this
system" when "legislative choices threaten to undermine the
foundations of the participatory democracy."5 7 In contrast to the courts
below, Chief Justice McLachlin was highly skeptical of the reasons
underlying the legislative choice to disenfranchise penitentiary inmates.
In her view, these reasons were not connected to the correction of any
"specific problem or concern."5 "
Instead, "vague and symbolic" objectives-enhancing civic
responsibility, respect for the rule of law, and the general purposes of
criminal sentencing-drove the decision to disenfranchise inmates. Such
"broad and abstract" objectives, the Chief Justice argued, are
susceptible to "distortion and manipulation."5 9 After articulating several
reasons why such suspect objectives should not be considered pressing
and substantial, the Chief Justice ultimately decided that, "despite the
abstract nature of the government's objectives and the rather thin basis
upon which they rest, prudence suggests that we proceed to the
proportionality analysis, rather than dismissing the government's
objectives outright."' Inmate disenfranchisement thus survived the first
54
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step in the Oakes test with the weakest possible judicial endorsement.
However, an already skeptical Chief Justice McLachlin became
explicitly-even if respectfully-hostile when she turned to the rational
connection prong of the proportionality test.
The Chief Justice stated the government's burden succinctly and
directly: it had to demonstrate, by evidence or logic, that inmate
disenfranchisement would enhance respect for the law and impose
legitimate punishment.6' She identified three theories that might serve
the government's purpose in this respect: first, that inmate
disenfranchisement educates prisoners and the general public about the
importance of respect for the law; second, that inmate voting demeans
the political system; and third, that disenfranchisement is a legitimate
form of punishment for any offence. She dismissed the first theory as
counterproductive. Relying on logic rather than evidence, she concluded
that inmate disenfranchisement communicates messages that tend to
undermine, rather than enhance, respect for law and democracy.
Indeed, she characterized the first theory as a "novel" one "that would
permit elected representatives to disenfranchise. a segment of the
population."62 This theory, she declared, has "no place in a democracy
built upon principles of inclusiveness, equality, and citizen
participation."63 Similarly, she rejected the second theory as being based
on the "ancient and obsolete" idea that categories-of persons could be
disenfranchised because of "moral unworthiness." ' This idea, she
stressed, "is inconsistent with the respect for the dignity of every person
that lies at the heart of Canadian democracy and the Charter 65
The government's last theory fared no better in Chief Justice
McLachlin's judgment. In her
view, the
argument
that
disenfranchisement was a legitimate component of the state's punitive
arsenal failed for two reasons. First, she was not convinced that denying
constitutional rights unrelated to legal rights could be used as
punishment. Second, she found that inmate disenfranchisement was
arbitrary and failed to promote any of the acceptable purposes of
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criminal sanctions (ie. deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and
denunciation). After stripping away the "fagade of rhetoric" from this
third theory, she found the claim that "criminals are people who have
broken society's norms and may therefore be denounced and punished
as the government sees fit, even to the point of removing fundamental
constitutional rights" to be untenable.66 The Chief Justice was
unconvinced and she simply rejected the argument that inmate
disenfranchisement advanced lawful penal objectives.
Chief Justice McLachlin's judgment elicited a particularly sharp
dissent from Justice Charles Gonthier, which was supported by Justices
Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, John Major, and Michel Bastarache. Justice
Gonthier described his disagreement with the Chief Justice as lying at a
more fundamental level than simply the immediate question of inmate
disenfranchisement. In his view, the case rested "on philosophical,
political and social considerations which are not capable of 'scientific
proof'."67 There was, in other words, no compelling reason to prefer her
view that temporary disenfranchisement of inmates injures the rule of
law, democracy, and the right to vote over his view that the Court should
defer "to Parliament's reasonable view that it strengthens these same
features of Canadian society."6 To do otherwise, he argued, would be to
make judicial preferences the principal criterion for judgment under
section 1 and to ignore the fact that "neither the courts nor Parliament
hold a monopoly on the determination of values."69
Why did Justice Gonthier consider it reasonable for Parliament
to conclude that inmate disenfranchisement might strengthen Canadian
democracy? He began by stressing the moral purposes underlying
criminal punishment, and the fact that Parliament had linked inmate
disenfranchisement to serious criminal conduct. Where Chief Justice
McLachlin saw disenfranchisement as an attack on the dignity and
worth of inmates, Justice Gonthier saw it as a recognition, through
punishment, of the rationality and autonomy of serious criminal
offenders. Moreover, he viewed such temporary disenfranchisement as
"morally educative" for inmates and the general population alike

6Ibid
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68Ibid.at 559.
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because it "reiterates society's commitment to the basic moral values
which underpin the Criminal Code."'7 The social contract underlying the
denunciation of crime, he continued, "relies upon the acceptance of the
rule of law and civic responsibility and on society's need to promote the
same;" to permit serious offenders to vote would undermine those two
values.7' Finally, Justice Gonthier's review of both provincial and foreign
practices-including American practices-indicated that Canada's
statute fell within the wide range of existing international approaches to
inmate disenfranchisement.72
Needless to say, Justice Gonthier's Oakes analysis generated a
very different result from the one produced by Chief Justice McLachlin.
In particular, he offered a more flexible understanding of the proof
necessary to establish a rational connection between means and ends.
Citing RJR-MacDonald, Justice Gonthier understood that a rational
connection could be established through "reason, logic, or simply
common sense."7 3 In the absence of an empirically demonstrable causal
relationship-in either direction-between inmate disenfranchisement
and its legislative objectives, Justice Gonthier looked to whether those
objectives "are at least logically furthered" by Parliament's chosen
policy.74 He answered this question in the affirmative, and reacted
harshly to Chief Justice McLachlin's opposite view by accusing her of
simply replacing "one reasonable position with another" and improperly
"dismissing the government's position as 'unhelpful'. 75
Chief Justice McLachlin's view that dialogue should not be
transformed into a doctrine of judicial deference seems to have been
influenced by an equally sharp dissent by Justice Iacobucci in
R. v. Hall, 76 decided only three weeks before Sauvd No. 2 At issue in
Hall was the constitutionality of bail provisions enacted in response to a
negative judicial decision. Led by Chief Justice McLachlin in a 5:4
decision, the majority found part of the new provisions
unconstitutionally vague, but upheld another part as constituting an
70
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intelligible standard. In defending deference on this second point, Chief
Justice McLachlin invoked the dialogue metaphor, arguing that Hall "is
an excellent example of such dialogue."77 Justice lacobucci reacted
strongly, accusing the Chief Justice of transforming "dialogue into
abdication." "The mere fact that Parliament has responded to a
constitutional decision of this Court," he argued, "is no reason to defer
to that response where it does not demonstrate a proper recognition of
the constitutional requirements imposed by that decision."78 Chief
Justice McLachlin was apparently persuaded by this argument, having
essentially adopted Justice Iacobucci's activist interpretation of dialogue
in Sauv No. 2,just as Justice Gonthier's dissent in Sauv&No. 2 adopted
the deferential interpretation for which Justice Iacobucci had been
criticized in Hall.
The McLachlin-Gonthier dispute in Sauv&No. 2, which was
quite sharp by Canadian standards, reveals the limitations of dialogue as
a formula for overcoming the inherent conflict between constitutional
judicial review and democracy. Like the interpretation of "reasonable
limits," the meaning of dialogue can vary from justice to justice. While
some justices-like Justice Iacobucci in Vriend and Hall and Chief
Justice McLachlin in Sauv& No. 2-may view it as a licence for
aggressive judicial review, others-like Justice Gonthier in Sauv&No. 2
and Chief Justice McLachlin in Hall-may view it as a rationale for
judicial deference. To return to the challenge that Justice Linden posed
in the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Sauv& No. 2, a bare
majority of the Court-and certainly the Chief Justice-decided that the
time had come to end the conversation about criminal
disenfranchisement. In this instance, the Court decided to have the last
word, and it had at its disposal the means to do so.
IV.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The serious attention given to the "CharterDialogue" article by
both scholars and judges is testimony to the problematic relationship
between rights-based judicial review and liberal constitutionalism. On
the one hand, rights-based judicial review is a positive element of liberal
democracy because it allows courts to perform the important counter-
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majoritarian function of safeguarding individual rights and liberties by
enforcing constitutional limits on legislative and executive power. On
the other hand, rights-based judicial review taken to its extreme
becomes an anti-democratic power wielded by courts to alter the
fundamental character of a nation's constitution without significant
popular participation or even public awareness. This tension exists even
in Canada, where constitutional supremacy and judicial authority to
nullify legislation is explicitly provided for in the constitutional text.79
Elsewhere, I have described this relationship as the "paradox of
liberal constitutionalism," which can be understood in the following way:
the purpose of a constitution is to constrain political power; rights-based
judicial review is a form of political power, and therefore constitutions
must constrain rights-based judicial review. The paradox is this: if rightsbased judicial review evolves such that political power in its judicial
guise is limited by a constitution whose meaning courts alone define,
then judicial power is no longer itself constrained by constitutional
limits."0 The "dialogue metaphor" in essence suggested a way out of this
paradox by arguing that constitutional supremacy had not degenerated
into judicial supremacy in Canada. This is undoubtedly the largest point
of contention between my position and the one articulated in the
"Charter Dialogue Revisited" article. Contrary to their position, 8' I
believe that legislatures do have coordinate authority to interpret the
constitution and that this authority is explicitly recognized in the
notwithstanding clause of section 33. As I have been arguing since the
first edition of JudicialPowerand the Charterin 1993, when understood
and used properly, section 33 "can have a positive impact by
encouraging a more politically vital discourse on the meaning of
rights." 2 What we need to encourage is real dialogue about what rights
mean, rather than automatic deference to the meaning offered by a
single political institution.
z ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11,
s.52.
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